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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE STAHL, 
Plaintiff-Appellant,: 
vs. 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Defendant-Respondent: 
RESPONDENT'S ERIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16419 
This is a negligence action brought by the Appellant 
against the Respondent for injuries sustained in a motor 
vehicle collision. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was originally heard by the Honorable G. Hal 
Taylor on December 19, 1978, who dismissed the Appellant's 
complaint, for failure to comply with the notice of claim 
requirement of Section 11-20-56 Utah Code Annotated, (1953), 
as amended, which requires that a claimant file a signed and 
verified complaint with the Board of Directors of the Utah 
Transit Authority (UTA) within thirty days after the injury 
complained of. 
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Judge Taylor allowed the Appellant ten days from that 
dismissal to amend her complaint, and an amended complaint 
was filed by Appellant on December 27, 1978 alleging in 
substance estoppel of UTA to allege lack of notice by the 
Appellant, based upon alleged actions of the adjuster for 
UTA's insurance carrier Transit Casualty. 
The depositions of the Appellant and insurance adjuster 
Thomas v~nce were taken and filed with the Court, and UTA 
again brought a motion to dismiss which was heard before the 
Honorable Christine M. Durham on March 30, 1979. Judge 
Durham granted the Respondent, UTA's motion for summary 
judgment, holding that Appellant had failed to comply with 
the notice of claim requirement set out in Section 11-20-56 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks a ruling affirming the judgment of the 
District Court. 
STATEMFNT OF FACTS 
The Appellant, Jolene Stahl, brought an action against 
the Respondent, Utah Transit Authority ("UTA"), alleging 
personal injuries as the result of a bus/automobile acci-
dent, which occurred on September 9, 1976, near 3100 South 
and 2700 West in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
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On the date of the accident, Thomas L. Vance, an adjuster 
for Brown Brothers Insurance, who represents UTA's insurer, 
Transit Casualty, made a routine investigation of the acci-
dent, and met with the Appellant. 
Adjuster Vence took a statement from Appellant concern-
ing the accident and obtained an authorization to release 
medical information. He did not indicate to Appellant that 
she should not file a claim with the UTA, nor did he indicate 
that he would be adjusting the claim or that he would be 
recontacting her in the future. 
On December 29, 1977, the UTA board of directors re-
ceived a notice of claim from Appellant, and a lawsuit was 
subsequently filed by Appellant on July 14, 1977. 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING 
APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO FILE 
A WRITTEN, SIGNED AND VERIFIED CLAIM WITH 
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF UTA WITHIN THIRTY 
DAYS AFTER THE INJURY. 
The Utah Public Transit District is a governmental 
entity which was established in 1969. Section 11-20-56 Utah 
Code Annotated (1953), as amended, pertains to the present-
ment and handling of claims against the UTA. It states: 
-3-
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Claims Against District -- Requirements. --
Every claim against the District for death, 
inJur~ or damage alleged to have been 
cause by the negligent act or omjssion of 
the district shall be presented to the board 
of directors in writing within thirty days 
after the death, inJury, or damage, signed 
and verified by the claimant or his duly 
authorized agent, stating the time and place 
where the injury or damage occurred and a 
general statement of the cause and circum-
stances of the death, inJury or damages. 
No action under this section shall be com-
menced until sixty days after presentation, 
or unless the board of directors shall 
sooner deny claim. (Emphasis added.) 
In the present case the accident for which the Appellant 
claims compensable damages occurred on September 9, 1976. 
The notice of claim was not received by the Board of Directors 
of UTA until December 29, 1976, and a complaint was not 
filed until July 14, 1977. 
Appellant clearly failed to comply with the statutory 
requirement, requiring filing of a written notice within 
thirty days of the injury as a condition precedent to the 
maintenance of an action against the UTA. Because this 
defect could not be cured, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor and 
the Honorable Christine M. Durham correctly dismissed 
Appellant's complaint. 
In the Utah decision of Gallegos vs. Midvale City, 27 
Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972), this court sustained a 
-4-
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trial court's dismissal of an action because a timely notice 
had not been filed. This Court stated at 29 and 30: 
The Doctrine of Soverign Immunity which would 
ordinarily protect the City from such a suit 
was part of the common law and thus part of 
the body of law which was assimilated into the 
law of this jurisdiction at statehood. The 
allowance of a claim against the city for in-
juries which may be suffered because of 'the .. 
defective, unsafe, dangerous ... condition 
of any street ... ' is a statutorily created 
exception to the Doctrine of Soverign Immunity. 
Inasmuch as the maintenance of such a cause of 
action derives from such statutory authority, 
a prerequisite thereto is meeting the condi-
tions prescribed in the statute. A party seek-
ing to obtain the benefit thereof should not 
be entitled to claim the favorable aspects 
which confer the rights, and disavow the con-
ditions upon which the rights are predicated. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In this case, as in Gallegos, the right to compensation 
is a statutory right, and all conditions precedent must be 
met by the Appellant. If the required conditions precedent 
are not met, no cause of action accrues, and no compensation 
can be awarded to the Appellant. 
In Peterson vs. Salt Lake City, 118 Utah 231, 221 P.2d 
591 (1950), where a plaintiff brought an action against the 
city for an allegedly defective sidewalk, this Court held 
that in order to maintain an action against a municipality, 
all conditions precedent, including notice, must be met. 
This Court stated at 235: 
-5-
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It is the prerogative of the legislature 
to make such conditions precedent to the 
maintenance of an action against a city 
or town as it sees fit and the courts can-
not relieve arties from the obli ation 
o meeting those conditions. Emphasis 
added.) 
The notice requirements of the analogous Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act have been tested and upheld by the Utah Supreme 
Court under many differing circumstances. The recent case 
of Crowder vs. Salt Lake County, 552 P.2d 646 (Utah 1976) upheld 
the constitutionality of the notice requirements when 
challenged on the basis of equal protection. This Court 
stated at 647: 
... it is generally held that the legislature 
has a wide discretion in enacting laws 
which effect one group of citizens dif-
ferently than other groups. 
In Point I of Appellant's brief, counsel for the Appellant 
attempts to draw a distinction between the Governmental 
Immunity Act, 63-30-12 UCA, which states that a claim is 
barred unless notice of the claim is filed with the Attorney 
General or the agency concerned within one year after the 
cause of action arises; and Section 11-20-56 UCA which 
provides that claims against UTA "shall be presented to the 
Board of Directors in writing within thirty days" after the 
accident and that "No action under this section shall be 
commenced until sixty days after presentation, or unless the 
board of directors shall sooner deny claim." 
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Appellant's argument is without merit that the language 
of the Transit District Act "shall be presented" or "no 
action under this section shall be commenced," is different 
in effect from the language of the Governmental Immunity Act 
which uses the word "bar". 
The language of Section 11-20-56 UCA is clear and un-
ambiguous in requiring the filing of written notice within 
thirty days or no action shall be commenced. In order for 
the notice of claim to be valid it must comply with the time 
limitations established by the legislature. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held in numerous decisions 
that in construing a statute the words must be given their 
logical and reasonable meaning. Illustrative cases are 
Smith vs. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279 P.2d 893, (1929) in which 
the court said at 367; "It is the duty of courts to so 
construe statutes and ordinances as to give effect to every 
word used.", and State vs. Hendrickson, 67 Utah 15, 245 P. 
375 (1926) where the court held that "in construing a statute 
words and phrases are construed according to the context and 
approved uses of language and except in the case of technical 
words and phrases they must be construed according to their 
plain and ordinary meaning." 
- 7-
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The filing of a verified claim with the board of direc-
tors of the UTA within thirty days following the injury is a 
condition precedent to the accrual of a cause of action. 
Courts cannot relieve parties from the obligation of meeting 
those conditions, and without proper statutory compliance by 
Appellant, UTA's governmental immunity remains. Appellant's 
claim was not filed within thirty days in the manner re-
quired by statute and this defect cannot be cured. 
POINT II. 
THE CONDUCT OF ADJUSTER THOMAS VANCE OF 
BROWN BROTHERS COMPANY, DOES NOT ESTOP 
UTA FROM ASSERTING THE NOTICE OF CLAIM 
DEFICIENCY AS A BAR TO THIS ACTION. 
When the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Judge dismissed the 
Appellant's complaint on December 19, 1978, he allowed the 
Appellant ten days to amend her complaint. An amended 
complaint was filed by Appellant on December 27, 1978 
alleging in substance estoppel of UTA to allege lack of 
notice by the Appellant, based upon alleged actions of the 
adjuster for UTA's insurance carrier, Transit Casualty. 
Paragraph 6 of the amended complaint states: 
6. That on the date of the accident, 
namely, September 9, 1976 the defendant 
Utah Transit Authority's authorized agent, 
Thomas L. Vance, an insurance adjuster for 
Brown Brothers, who had been designated 
by the Utah Transit Authority's Board of 
-8-
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Directors to act as its agent to handle 
claims against the Utah Transit Authority 
for death, injury or damage caused by 
negligence obtained from the plaintiff a 
writing as contemplated by Title 11-20-56, 
Utah Code Annotated, and also instructed 
the plaintiff that if she desired to pre-
sent a claim against the Utah Transit 
Authority that she should present the 
claim through his office, namely, the in-
surance adjuster's office, whose company 
was the liability insurance carrier for 
the Utah Transit Authority, rather than 
presenting any claim to the Utah Transit 
Authority, referred to him as the "bus 
company." . 
After the filing of the amended complaint, the per-
tinent portion of which is cited above, depositions of 
Appellant Jolene Stahl and insurance adjuster Thomas L. 
Vance were taken. Neither deposition supports Appellant's 
theory of waiver or estoppel against UTA. The depositions 
also fail to support Appellant's allegation that Thomas 
Vance was authorized to act as agent for UTA in receiving 
required notice under the Act. 
Vance did represent Transit Ca.sual ty Insurance Company 
which carried the liability insurance coverage for UTA, 
(R.87, Vance depo. p.4, L.7-9) and acted on behalf of UTA 
and their indemnitor to investigate bodily injury claims. 
(R.87, Vance depo. p.6, L.12-15) 
When the investigation is completed a report is made to 
Transit Casualty Insurance Company, not to the UTA, nor is 
-9-
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UTA furnished a copy of the investigative report. 
Vance depo. p.7, L.10-25) 
(R. 8 7, 
Vance took a written report from the plaintiff, con-
taining her version of the accident. (R. 87, Vance depo. 
p.8, L.4-15) After taking her statement, Vance did not 
indicate to the plaintiff that he would be recontacting her 
for the purpose of possibly adjusting the claim (R. 87, 
Vance depo. p.10, L.12-15) nor did he indicate to her that 
if she had any questions about a possible claim that she 
should contact him or someone at Brown Brothers. 
Vance depo. p.10, L.20 to p.11,L.3) 
(R. 8 7, 
Vance did not tell her that she should present her 
claim to UTA. (R. 87, Vance depo. p.12,L.7 to p.13,L.15) 
On September 9, 1976, the date of the accident, Vance 
did obtain a medical authorization to contact the plain-
tiff's physician, Dr. A. F. Martin, to obtain a medical 
report for the purpose of the inves tiga ti on. (R. 8 7, Vance 
depo. p.15,L.19 to p.16,L.25) 
It should be pointed our that counsel for Appellant at 
page 8 of the brief has erroneously characterized Vance's 
testimony. Nowhere in the record is it supported that 
"assuming Appellant had asked Mr. Vance whether she should 
contact the respondent, Mr. Vance would have told her that 
she did not have to because he handled all the respondent's 
claims. (R. 87, depo. of Vance, at 12) ." Vance testified as 
follows: 
-10-
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Q. (By Mr. Bennett:) Did you tell her 
that she should present any kind of a 
claim right to the Utah Transit 
Authority rather than through your company? 
A. I definitely did not. 
Q. Is there any reason why you did not 
tell her that? 
A. Yes. All claims, claims against the bus 
company, are handled directly by our 
office and specifically by myself. I 
never refer anyone to the bus company. In 
fact, if -- well, I just don't, in any 
case. 
Q. You would prefer that they handle all 
possible claims, then, through you and 
your company rather than going directly 
MR. HANSON: Well I'm going to object to that. 
That isn't what he said. You're assuming 
a fact he hasn't testified to. 
THE WITNESS: No, I do not prefer that. It's 
just a fact that all claims against the 
bus company come through our office. 
* * * * Q. (By Mr. Bennett:) Did you so instruct Mrs. 
Stahl that you wanted her to present her 
claims through your company rather than 
through the bus company? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Did you tell her to present them to the 
bus company? 
No, I didn't. 
Did you indicate that you would be 
getting back in touch with her? 
No, I didn't. 
-11-
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None of Vance's testimony supports the allegations that 
he or Brown Brothers in making the investigation were acting 
as agents of UTA or that Vance made any representations to 
the plaintiff to the effect that her claim would be settled, 
from which she could reasonably contend was the cause of her 
not filing a notice of claim as required under Section 11-
2 0 - 5 6 UCA, (19 5 3) . 
Vance made the investigation solely as an employee of 
Brown Brothers who represented UTA's insurance carrier, 
Transit Casualty. 
In Vadner vs. Rozzelle, 88 Utah 162, 45 P.2d 561, 
(1935) the Court stated: 
An insurance adjuster is ordinarily a special 
agent for the company for whom he acts, and his 
authority is prima facia coexistent with the 
business entrusted to him which usually is 
limited to ascertainment and adjustment of the 
loss. 
The deposition of Appellant Jolene Stahl also clearly 
indicates that she was not promised that her case would be 
settled, and neither was she instructed to not file a claim 
with the UTA, or otherwise "lulled" into a failure of filing 
her notice. 
In her deposition taken on July 12, 1978, she states: 
-12-
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Q. Let me ask you, I understand after the acci-
dent you were contacted by Mr. Vance, Insur-
ance Adjuster? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long after the accident did he 
see you? 
A. The day of the accident. 
Q. Where did he see you, at your home? 
A. No. At my work. 
Q. At your work. Do you remember, did you 
have a conversation with him? 
A. Oh, he called me earlier that day and asked 
if he could come out to get a statement. 
That is the reason I stayed at work, you 
know, as long as I did. 
Q. I see. Did he come out and take a state-
ment? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. And in that statement you told him --
A. What happened. 
Q. What happened. Was there anything else 
said or did you have any conversation with 
him when you took the statement? 
A. Yes. He was there for quite a while. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
TeJl em what he--other than what is in 
the statement, I assume you saw the state-
ment before you came up here, didn't you? 
I have a copy of it. 
Other than what is in the statement, 
did he tell you anything else or did 
you have any other conversation? 
-13-
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A. No. 
Q. Was there anything said to you about filing 
any kind of a claim or anything of that 
nature? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you see him again after that? 
A. No. 
Q. That is the only time you saw him? 
A. Yes. That is the only time I saw him. 
* * * 
MR. BENNETT: Just for clarification, you mean 
was there any conversation in addition to the 
statement? 
MR. HANSON: Yes. That is what I mean. 
MR. BENNETT: Okay. Do you understand that, 
Jolene? 
THE WITNESS: There was just conversation about 
the accident. 
Q. (By Mr. Hanson) Nothing said about filing 
claims or contacting anybody or anything 
of that nature? 
A. No. 
Q. By that you mean there wasn't? 
A. No, there wasn't. 
Q. In other words, he just talked to you about 
the accident and took a statement and you 
read it and signed it, is that right? 
-14-
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A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have any subsequent contact with 
Mr. Vance--I think I asked you that question, 
but I am not sure. Did you see him again? 
A. No. 
Q. Have any telephone conversation with him? 
A. I believe I did. I believe l--I don't, 
I can't remember. 
Q. Do you know what the conversation was 
about, if there was a subsequent one? 
A. It seems like I had, it was something to 
do with the insurance. When the insurance 
people called about the settlement on the 
car. 
Q. Oh, I see. Do you remember that conver-
sation, the date it happened? 
A. No , I don' t. 
Q. Did you have any other contacts with Mr. 
Vance other than these two instances you 
have told us about? 
A. No. 
Deposition of Jolene Stahl at pp. 25,26,27 and 28. 
* * * 
Q. . .Did Mr. Vance give you any kind of 
a card or any identification? 
A. Yes he gave me his card. 
Q. What did he say when he gave you his card? 
A. He said that he would be the adjuster for, 
you know that he was the adjuster, and that 
-15 -
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that was why he was there to take the 
statement. If I had any questions or what-
ever to call him. 
Q. Is that all he said about his card? 
Is that everything he said about the card? 
A. As far as I can remember. 
Deposition of Jolene Stahl at p. 30. 
In Appellant's brief, she cites the Utah decision of 
Rice vs. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 
159, (1969) for the proposition that the notice of claims 
provision in the Utah Governmental Act can be waived by a 
political subdivision or its insurance adjuster. The facts 
of that case are clearly distinguishable from the facts in 
this case. In Rice, the plaintiff did file a notice of 
claim within the thirty-day statutory period, but thereafter 
failed to file a suit within the statutory limitation period 
of one year because of reliance on an adjuster's repre-
sentations that the claim would be settled and that suit was 
unnecessary. 
In Rice, the court rightly held that the adjuster's 
actions in "lulling" the plaintiff into assuming that her 
claim would be settled, operated as an estoppel eliminating 
the requirement that suit be filed within one year. 
The testimony in the depositions of Appellant and 
Vance, cited above, clearly establish that Vance made no 
-16-
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representations to the plaintiff that the claim would be 
settled and that suit was not necessary as was done in Rice. 
In Rice, the claimant's cause of action came into existence 
when she complied with the statutory condition precedent of 
filing notice of her claim within the ninety-day period. To 
the contrary, in this case the Appellant did not obtain a 
viable cause of action because of her failure to file the 
statutorily required notice of claim within the thirty-day 
period. Without this condition precedent being met, the 
Appellant cannot now claim that the alleged estoppel or 
waiver of the defendant established her claim which never 
came into being because of failure to comply with the 
thirty-day notice requirement. 
POINT III. 
THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION SUMMARY PREPARED 
BY INSURA~CE ADJUSTER TOM V;\NCE, AFTER 
SPEAKING WITH APPELLANT, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
NOTICE AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 11-20-56 OF 
UTAH'S PUBLIC TRANSIT DISTRICT ACT. 
On the date of the accident, September 9, 1976, Tom 
Vance, an adjuster for Utah Transit Authority's insurance 
carrier, spoke by telephone with the Appellant concerning 
the accident. At page 8 of the deposition of Tom Vance it 
states: 
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Q. I show you what has been marked as 
Deposition Exhibit P-1 and ask if this 
is a copy of statement that you wrote? 
A. Yes, it is two pages. 
Q. Did you take notes independent of that 
statement? 
A. No. 
Q. You just talked with her, made up that 
statement, and had her sign it? 
A. Yes, I wrote it as I spoke with her. 
As noted in Point I of this brief Section 11-20-56 of 
the UCA requires that: 
Every claim against the district for 
... injury ... shall be presented to 
the board of directors in writing within 
thirty days after the . . . injury . . . 
signed and verified by the claimant ... 
stating the time and place where the 
injury or damage occurred and a general 
statement of the cause and circumstances 
of the ... injury. 
Appellant alleges in Point III of her brief that adjus-
ter Tom Vance's actual knowledge of the accident constituted 
sufficient notice as contemplated by Section 11-20-56 UCA, 
UCA, cited above. However, a summary prepared by an insur-
ance investigator in the routine course of his investigation 
does not constitute verified written notice as required by 
the Act. 
Plaintiff's have often alleged that conversations, such 
as the telephone conversation between Mr. Vance and the 
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Appellant, should comply with the notice provisions of 
various governmental immunity acts. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when a 
written notice is required, constructive notice will not 
suffice. In Varoz vs. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435, 
(1953), this Court held that a county official's actual 
knowledge of an accident that resulted in the death of a 
minor child's mother did not dispose with the necessity of 
filing a timely notice for compensation. This Court stated 
at 160: 
From the language of the statute it is 
quite clear that the legislature intended 
to make the filing of a timely notice of 
claim prerequisite to maintaining an action. 
This court has carried this reasoning even further by 
requiring that compliance with the notice requirement be 
pleaded in the complaint. In Roosendaal Construction and 
Mining Corporation vs. Holman, 28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446, 
(1972), this Court stated: 
It appears that the plaintiff's complaint 
is fatally defective in that it does not 
allege compliance with that section. 
(That section being 63-30-12 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), notice requirements.) 
Similarly, in Scarborough vs. Granite School District, 
531 P.2d 480 (Utah, 1975), this Ccurt held that even though 
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a school principal had examined and talked to an injured 
boy, such examination did not constitute notice under the 
statute. At page 482 this Court stated: 
We have consistently held that where a 
cause of action is based upon a statute 
full compliance with its requirements is 
a condition precedent to the right to 
maintain a suit ... It should require no 
exposition to demonstrate that the oral 
conversation with the school principal 
and the fact that he turned in a report 
to the School District, do not satisfy 
the foregoing requirements. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the recent decision Sears vs. Southworth, 563 P.2d 
192 (Utah 1977) this Ccurt held that even though state law 
enforcement officers had investigated an accident and filed 
the report with the State, this report did not constitute 
notice under the Governmental Immunity Act. This court 
stated: 
Third, Southworth argues that, although 
no formal notice of claim was filed within 
the year as required, State did receive 
adequate notice of the accident and was 
aware, or should have been aware of the 
negligence involved. . .This point 
is not a matter of first impression with 
this court. 
In an excellant summary of the existing Utah law on 
notice requirements the court went on to cite and reaffirm 
the portions of Varoz vs. Sevey , supra. and Scarborough vs. 
Granite School District, cited, supra. 
-20-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The facts of the present case fall squarely under the 
rule of Sevey, Scarborough, and Sears which hold that actual 
knowledge or investigative reports do not comply with the 
notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act. The 
two page summary prepared by adjuster Tom Vance for Transit 
Casualty Company, the insurer for UTA, was not sufficient 
notice as required by Section 11-20-56 UCA. Appellant's 
complaint was rightly dismissed by the trial court for 
Appellant's failure to give timely statutory notice as a 
condition precedent to the filing of her action. 
POINT IV. 
THE PROCUREMENT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 
BY A GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY HAS NO EFFECT 
UPON ITS IMMUNITY FROM TORT LIABILITY. 
In footnote 1 on page 9 of Appellant's brief, Appellant 
contends that a governmental entity waives immunity by 
taking out liability insurance. 
This contention is against the clear weight of authority 
in the United States as noted in 68 ALR 2d, titled "Liability 
or Indemnity Insurance Carried by a Governmental Unit as 
Affecting Immunity from Tort Liability". In that anno-
tation, the majority rule is stated as follows: 
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In a majority of jurisdictions, it is 
held that the procurement of liability 
or indemnity insurance by a governmental 
unit has no effect upon its immunity from 
tort liability. 
As noted above, the general rule would not provide 
waiver of immunity to a governmental entity merely because 
that entity has obtained liability insurance. 
Whether or not a party has liability coverage, has long 
been excluded under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
as being not relevant to the issue of liability or negli-
gence. Similarly, in the present case, it would not be 
equitable to punish either a governmental entity for obtain-
ing liability insurance, or to punish its insurer for 
extending coverage to a governmental entity. 
The presence of liability insurance should not serve to 
waive sovereign immunity, especially in this case, where 
statutory requirements for filing suit have not been com-
plied with. 
CONCLUSION 
The UTA is a governmental entity, and the legislature 
has the prerogative to make such conditions precedent to 
waiver of that governmental immunity as it sees fit. The 
courts cannot relieve parties from the obligation of meeting 
those conditions. 
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The filing of a verified claim with the board of direc-
tors of the UTA within thirty days following the injury is a 
condition precedent to an injured party's accrual of a cause 
of action. In this case, the accident for which Appellant 
claims damages, occurred on September 9, 1976. The notice 
of claim was not filed by Appellant with the board of direc-
tors of the UTA until December 29, 1976, nearly four months 
subsequent to the accident. 
Appellant clearly failed to comply with the notice of 
claim requirement of Section 11-20-56 UCA, and inasmuch as 
this defect could not be cured, both the Honorable G. Hal 
Taylor and the Honorable Christine M. Durham correctly 
dismissed Appellant's complaint. 
The depositions of both Appellant and adjuster Vance 
fail to point out a single question of fact on the issue of 
waiver or estoppel. The facts of this case are clearly 
distinguishable from those of Rice where a timely notice of 
claim was filed, but where there were substantial issues of 
fact as to representations, assurances, and promises on the 
part of the adjuster who "lulled" and "gulled" and otherwise 
induced the plaintiff into not filing her complaint until 
-23-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the one year statute of limitations had run. 
,1/.. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ~day of August, 1979. 
PERSONALLY DELIVERED ten copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Respondent to the clerk of the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah and two copies to Appellant's attorney, Wendell E. 
Bennett, 370 East 500 South, #100, Salt Lake City, Utah this 
//{/-.! day of August, 1979. 
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